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Abstract
Sample size derivation is a crucial element of the planning phase of any confirmatory trial.
A sample size is typically derived based on constraints on the maximal acceptable type I
error rate and a minimal desired power. Here, power depends on the unknown true effect
size. In practice, power is typically calculated either for the smallest relevant effect size or a
likely point alternative. The former might be problematic if the minimal relevant effect is
close to the null, thus requiring an excessively large sample size. The latter is dubious since
it does not account for the a priori uncertainty about the likely alternative effect size. A
Bayesian perspective on the sample size derivation for a frequentist trial naturally emerges
as a way of reconciling arguments about the relative a priori plausibility of alternative effect
sizes with ideas based on the relevance of effect sizes. Many suggestions as to how such
‘hybrid’ approaches could be implemented in practice have been put forward in the literature.
However, key quantities such as assurance, probability of success, or expected power are
often defined in subtly different ways in the literature. Starting from the traditional and
entirely frequentist approach to sample size derivation, we derive consistent definitions for
the most commonly used ‘hybrid’ quantities and highlight connections, before discussing and
demonstrating their use in the context of sample size derivation for clinical trials.
Keywords Assurance · Expected power · Probability of success · Power · Sample size derivation
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1 Introduction
Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs) are the gold-standard study design for evaluating the effectiveness and
safety of new interventions. Despite their successful history of demonstrating the benefits and uncovering
the risks of new treatments, they face substantial challenges. Recent evidence has shown that the success
rate of RCTs is low [Wong et al., 2019]. This low success rate and the increasing cost of conducting RCTs is
resulting in large real-term increases in the cost of drug development [DiMasi et al., 2016]. Since the sample
size of a trial is a key determinant of the chances of detecting a treatment effect (if it is present) and an
important cost factor, the choice of an adequate sample size enables more economic drug development. Purely
economic arguments would suggest a utility based approach as discussed in Lindley [1997], for example.
However, specifying utility functions, particularly in investigator-sponsored studies concerned with non-drug
interventions, can be hard in practice. These practical problems, the desire to maintain minimal ethical
standards, as well as recommendations of health authority guidelines result in the vast majority of confirmatory
clinical trials deriving their sample size based on desired conditional type I and type II error rates. For
instance, a randomised clinical trial with an unnecessarily large sample size (‘overpowered’) is unethical if the
treatment shows a substantial effect and the consequences of being randomised to the control arm are severe.
Thus the issue of selecting an appropriate sample size is a vitally important part of conducting a clinical trial.
The traditional approach to determining the required sample size for a trial is to choose a point alternative
and derive a sample size such that the probability to reject the null hypothesis exceeds a certain threshold
(typically 80% or 90%) while maintaining a certain maximal type I error rate (typically 2.5% one-sided).
The maximal type I error rate is usually realised at the boundary of the null hypothesis and thus available
immediately. The type II error rate, however, critically depends on the choice of the (point) alternative.
There are at least two ways of justifying the choice of point alternative. The first is based on a relevance
argument, which requires the specification of a minimal clinically relevant difference (MCID). Since the
probability to reject the null hypothesis is typically monotonic in the effect size, determining the sample
size such that the desired probability to reject the null is exceeded at the MCID implies that the power
for all other relevant differences will be even larger. Guidance has recently been published on choosing the
MCID [Cook et al., 2018], but making this choice may still be difficult in practice.
The second perspective is based on a priori considerations about the likelihood of the treatment effect. Here,
an a priori likely effect size is used as the point alternative. This implies that the resulting sample size might
be too small to detect smaller but still relevant differences reliably. On the other hand, the potential savings
in terms of sample size might outweigh the risk of ending up with an underpowered study. The core difference
between these approaches is that basing the required sample size on the MCID might be ineffective if prior
evidence for a larger effect is available, but the MCID is chosen based on relevance arguments and is thus not
subject to uncertainty. In contrast, choosing the point alternative based on considerations about the relative
a priori likelihood of effect sizes implies that there is an inherent uncertainty about the effect size that can
be expected – otherwise no trial would be needed in the first place.
Depending on the study objective, the sample size can also be derived based on entirely different considerations.
For example, studies that aim to establish new diagnostic tools or biomarkers would rather target a certain
width of the confidence interval for the AUC [Obuchowski, 1998]. Similarly, studies aimed at estimating
population parameters with sufficient precision should target the standard error of the estimate, rather than
deriving a sample size based on power arguments [Thompson, 2012, Grouin et al., 2007]. These approaches
are beyond the scope of this manuscript and we will only discuss sample size derivation based on error rate
considerations.
To make things more tangible, consider the case of a simple one-stage, one-arm Z-test. Let Xi, i = 1, . . . , n,
be iid observations with mean θ and known standard deviation σ. Under suitable regularity conditions, their
mean is asymptotically normal and Zn :=
√
n
(
X − θ0
)
/σ
·∼ N
(
θn, 1
)
where θn :=
√
n(θ − θ0)/σ. Assume
that interest lies in testing the null hypothesis H0 : θ ≤ θ0 = 0 at a one-sided significance level of α. The
critical value for rejecting H0 is given by the (1− α)-quantile of the standard normal distribution, z1−α, and
is independent of n. The probability of rejecting the null hypothesis for given n and θ is
Prθ[Zn > z1−α ] = 1− Φ
(
z1−α − θn
)
= Φ
(
θn − z1−α
)
, (1)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution. Often, Prθ[Zn >
z1−α ] is seen as a function of θ and termed the ‘power function’. This terminology may lead to confusion
when considering parameter values θ ≤ θ0 and θ ≥ θMCID, since the probability to reject the null hypothesis
corresponds to the type I error rate in the former case and classical ‘power’ in the latter. For the sake of
clarity we will thus use the neutral term ‘probability to reject’.
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Assume that a point alternative θalt > θ0 is given. A sample size can then be chosen as the smallest sample
size that results in a probability to reject of at least 1− β at θalt
n∗θalt := argmin
n
n
subject to: Prθalt [Zn > z1−α ] ≥ 1− β . (2)
Since Prθ[Zn > z1−α ] is monotone in θ, the probability to reject the null hypothesis for θ > θalt is also greater
than 1 − β. Thus, if θalt = θMCID, the null hypothesis can be rejected for all clinically relevant effect sizes
with a probability of at least 1− β. This approach requires no assumptions about the a priori likelihood
of the value of θ but only about θMCID and the desired minimal power level (see also [Chuang-Stein et al.,
2011, Section 3] and Chuang-Stein, 2006). However, the required sample size increases quickly as θMCID
approaches θ0. In almost all practically relevant situations, a maximal feasible sample size is given (e.g.,
due to budget constraints), which might not be sufficient to achieve the desired power if θMCID is close to
θ0. This problem might arise when considering overall survival in oncology trials, for example. However, it
may then be hard to justify a value for θMCID much larger than θ0 since almost any improvement in overall
survival can be considered relevant 2. The problem becomes even more pressing if the null hypothesis is
defined as H′0 : θ ≤ θMCID, i.e., if the primary study objective is to demonstrate a clinically important effect.
In either case it is clearly impossible to derive a feasible sample size based on the minimal clinically important
difference alone [Chuang-Stein et al., 2011]. Formulating a principled approach to eliciting a sample size in
situations like these is difficult, and in practice trialists may resort to back-calculating an effect size in order
to achieve the desired power given the maximum feasible sample size [Lenth, 2001, Lan and Wittes, 2012,
Grouin et al., 2007]. One way of justifying a smaller sample size is to consider a point alternative θalt > θMCID
based on a priori likelihood arguments: if there is prior evidence for effect sizes larger than θMCID, determining
the sample size based on θMCID might well be inefficient and lead to an unnecessarily large trial. Therefore,
planning of the required sample size is often based on a single point alternative θalt, θalt > θMCID. Yet, this
pragmatic approach is unsatisfactory in that it ignores any uncertainty about the effect size [Lenth, 2001].
In the following, we review approaches to sample size derivation that do account for a priori uncertainty via a
prior density for the effect size. We propose a framework encompassing the most relevant quantities discussed
in this context, give precise definitions of the terms, and highlight connections between individual items.
Where necessary, we refine existing definitions to improve overall consistency. Note that we exclusively focus
on what is usually termed a ‘hybrid’ Bayesian-frequentist approach to sample size derivation [Spiegelhalter
et al., 2004]. This means that, although, Bayesian arguments are used to derive a sample size under uncertainty
about the true effect size, the final analysis is strictly frequentist. After introducing the individual concepts in
detail, a structured overview of all quantities considered is provided in Figure 1. We then present a review of
the literature on the subject, showcasing the confusing diversity of terminology used in the field and relating
our definitions back to the existing literature. Finally, we present some numerical examples and conclude
with a discussion.
2 A Bayesian argument for the choice of the point alternative
One way of incorporating planning uncertainty is to make assumptions about the relative a priori likelihood
of the unknown effect size. This approach can be formalised within a Bayesian framework by seeing the true
effect size θ as the realisation of a random variable Θ with prior density ϕ(θ). This means that the CDF of Θ
is given by Pr[ Θ ≤ x ] = ∫ x0 ϕ(θ) d θ. At the planning stage, the probability to reject the null hypothesis is
then given by the random variable RPR(n), the ‘random probability to reject’:
RPR(n) := PrΘ[Zn > z1−α ] . (3)
We explicitly denote this quantity as ‘random’ to emphasise the distinction between the (conditional on
Θ = θ) probability to reject given in equation (1) and the unconditional ‘random’ probability to reject. The
variation of the random variable RPR(n) reflects the a priori uncertainty about the unknown underlying
effect size that is encoded in the prior density ϕ(·) of the random variable Θ. We prefer the term ‘random
probability to reject’ over ‘random power’ since RPR(n) is unconditional on the effect size, and consequently
does not distinguish between rejections under the null hypothesis and under relevant effect sizes. Instead,
2It is important to distinguish between the (unknown) true effect size and the observed effect size. It might still be
reasonable to additionally require a certain deviation of the observed effect from the null, e.g. a hazard ratio of less
than 0.85.
3
A preprint - June 30, 2020
we define the conditional random variable ‘random power’ as
RPow(n) := Pr Θ≥θMCID [Zn > z1−α ] (4)
= RPR(n) | Θ ≥ θMCID. (5)
This definition more closely resembles the concept of frequentist power since it conditions on a relevant effect
size.
Determining the required sample size based on a point alternative as outlined in the introduction evaluates
the probability to reject the null hypothesis solely on θalt. This can be understood as conditioning the random
probability to reject, or the random power, on Θ = θalt, i.e., to consider
(
RPR(n) | Θ = θalt
)
=
(
RPow(n) |
Θ = θalt
)
. Due to conditioning on a single parameter value θalt ≥ θMCID, under any prior density with ϕ(θalt) > 0,
both random variables (almost surely) reduce to the deterministic expression Prθalt [Zn > z1−α ] which is
often termed ‘power’ in a frequentist context. Basing the sample size derivation on this quantity means that
the probability to reject the null hypothesis for relevant values of θ ≥ θMCID, θ 6= θalt is completely ignored and
the a priori evidence encoded in ϕ(·) is not used.
Spiegelhalter and Freedman [1986] have pointed out that a power constraint for sample size derivation could
be computed based on “[...] a somewhat arbitrarily chosen location parameter of the [prior] distribution (for
example the mean, the median or the 70th percentile).” Using a location parameter of the unconditional prior
distribution of Θ, however, might lead to situations where no sample size can be determined if the location
parameter lies within the null hypothesis. Here, we follow a similar idea but motivate the choice of location
parameter in terms of the a priori distribution of random power. To this end, let
Q1−γ [ RPow(n) ] := inf
x
Prϕ(·)
[
RPow(n) ≥ x ] ≥ γ (6)
be the (1− γ)-quantile of the random power (RPow(n)). Furthermore, let
ϕ(θ |Θ ≥ θMCID) := 1θ≥θMCID ϕ(θ)∫ ∞
θMCID
ϕ(x) dx
(7)
be the conditional prior density of
(
Θ | Θ ≥ θMCID
)
. We choose to make the dependency of
Prϕ(·)
[
RPow(n) ≥ x ] = ∫ ∞
−∞
ϕ(θ |Θ ≥ θMCID) Prθ[Zn > z1−α ] d θ (8)
on the prior density explicit by using the index ‘ϕ(·)’ since the random parameter Θ does not appear directly
in the description of the event ‘RPow(n) ≥ x’. Whenever Θ appears explicitly, we omit the index since the
dependency on ϕ(·) is then clear from the context. The expression Prϕ(·)
[
RPow(n) ≥ x ] is a real number
in [ 0, 1 ] and thus different from RPR(n) = PrΘ[Zn > z1−α ] which is a random variable.
If a sample size was then chosen such that Q1−γ [ RPow(n) ] ≥ 1− β, the a priori probability of exceeding a
probability to reject of 1− β given a relevant effect would be, by definition, at least γ. The required sample
size for this approach is the solution of
argmin
n
n
subject to: Q1−γ [ RPow(n) ] ≥ 1− β . (9)
Since Prθ[Zn > z1−α ] is monotonic in θ, this problem is equivalent to solving
n∗γ := argmin
n
n
subject to: Pr Q1−γ [ Θ≥θMCID ]
[
Zn > z1−α
] ≥ 1− β , (10)
where Q1−γ [ Θ ≥ θMCID ] is the (1− γ)-quantile of the prior distribution of the random variable Θ conditional
on a relevant effect. Consequently, this ‘prior quantile approach’ can be used with any existing frequentist
sample size derivation formula. It is merely a formal Bayesian justification for determining the sample size of
a trial based on a point alternative θalt := Q1−γ [ Θ ≥ θMCID ] ≥ θMCID. The prior quantile approach reduces to
powering on θMCID whenever the target power needs to be met with absolute certainty for all relevant effect
sizes (γ = 1). One may thus see the prior quantile approach as a principled relaxation of powering on θMCID.
The approach differs from Spiegelhalter and Freedman’s suggestions in two key aspects. Firstly, the point
alternative naturally emerges as a quantile of the prior conditional on a relevant effect by imposing a lower
4
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boundary on the a priori probability to undershoot the target power. This intuitively makes sense since
a large probability to reject is only desirable when the underlying θ is relevant. This also ensures that
Q1−γ [ Θ ≥ θMCID ] > θMCID ≥ θ0 for γ < 1 and thus guarantees a finite sample size irrespective of the choice of
prior. Secondly, to guarantee a more than 50% chance of exceeding the target power, the conditional prior
quantile will typically be chosen smaller (i.e., γ > 0.5) than the conditional median (γ = 0.5) which was
discussed by Spiegelhalter and Freedman.
3 Probability of success and expected power
Spiegelhalter and Freedman also proposed the use of the “probability of concluding that the new treatment is
superior and of this being correct” (PSs in their notation) to derive a required sample size [Spiegelhalter and
Freedman, 1986]. The quantity has also been referred to as ‘prior adjusted power’ [Spiegelhalter et al., 2004,
Shao et al., 2008]. This definition of probability of success is also discussed in Liu [2010] and Ciarleglio et al.
[2015]. In the situation at hand, it reduces to
PoS(n) := Pr[Zn > z1−α,Θ ≥ θMCID ] (11)
=
∫ ∞
θMCID
∫ ∞
z1−α
φ(z − θn) ϕ(θ) d z d θ , (12)
where φ is the PDF of the standard normal distribution. Here, we are slightly more general than previous
authors in that we allow θMCID > 0 and use a tighter definition of ‘success’: a trial is only successful if the null
hypothesis is rejected and the effect is relevant. Whenever θMCID = 0 this coincides with the definitions used
previously in the literature.
The definition of PoS(n) critically relies on what is being considered a ‘success’. The original proposal of
Spiegelhalter and Freedman only considers a significant study result a success if the underlying effect is also
non-null (i.e., the joint probability of non-null and detection). In more recent publications, a majority of
authors tend to follow O’Hagan et al. who consider a slightly different definition of the probability of success
by integrating the probability to reject over the entire parameter range [O’Hagan and Stevens, 2001, O’Hagan
et al., 2005] and term this ‘assurance’. For a more comprehensive overview of the terms used in the literature,
see Section 5. The alternative definition for probability of success introduced by O’Hagan et al. corresponds
to the marginal probability of rejecting the null hypothesis irrespective of the corresponding parameter value
PoS′(n) := Pr[Zn > z1−α ] (13)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
z1−α
φ(z − θn) ϕ(θ) d z d θ (14)
= PoS(n) + Pr[Zn > z1−α, 0 < Θ < θMCID ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
probability of rejection and irrelevant effect
+ Pr[Zn > z1−α,Θ ≤ 0 ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
probability of a type I error
. (15)
The decomposition in equation (15) makes it clear that the implicit definition of ‘success’ underlying PoS′(n)
is at least questionable [Liu, 2010]. The marginal probability of rejecting the null hypothesis includes
rejections under irrelevant or even null values of θ, and is thus inflated by type I errors and rejections under
irrelevant values of θ. This issue was first raised by Spiegelhalter et al. [2004] for simple (point) null and
alternative hypotheses. The degree to which PoS(n) and PoS′(n) differ numerically is discussed in more detail
in Section 7.2. Which definition of ‘success’ is preferred mainly depends on perspective: a short-term oriented
pharmaceutical company might just be interested in rejecting the null hypothesis to monetise a new drug -
irrespective of it actually showing a relevant effect. This view would then correspond to PoS′(n). Regulators
and companies worried about the longer-term consequences of potentially having to retract ineffective drugs,
might tend towards the joint probability of correctly rejecting the null, i.e., PoS(n). We take the latter
perspective and focus on PoS(n).
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PoS(n) is an unconditional quantity and must therefore implicitly depend on the a priori probability of a
relevant effect. To see this, consider the following decomposition
PoS(n) = Pr[Zn > z1−α,Θ ≥ θMCID ] (16)
=
∫ ∞
θMCID
Prθ[Zn > z1−α ] ϕ(θ) d θ (17)
= Pr[Zn > z1−α | Θ ≥ θMCID ] Pr[ Θ ≥ θMCID ] (18)
= E
[
Pr Θ≥θMCID [Zn > z1−α ]
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
= E[ RPow(n) ] =: EP(n)
Pr[ Θ ≥ θMCID ] . (19)
This means that the probability of success can be expressed as the product of the ‘expected power’, EP(n),
and the a priori probability of a relevant effect (see again Spiegelhalter et al. [2004] for the situation with
point hypotheses). Expected power was implicitly mentioned in Spiegelhalter and Freedman [1986] (PSs/P·s
in their notation) as a way to characterise the properties of a design. The use of expected power as a means
to derive the required sample size of a design under uncertainty was then proposed in Brown et al. [1987] by
solving
n∗EP := argmin
n
n
subject to: EP(n) ≥ 1− β . (20)
Since the power function is monotonically increasing in θ, expected power is strictly larger than power
at the minimal relevant value whenever Pr[ Θ > θMCID ] > 0. This implies that a constraint on expected
power instead of a constraint on the probability to reject the null hypothesis at θMCID is less restrictive, and
consequently n∗EP < n∗θMCID .
The terms ‘expected power’ and ‘probability of success’ are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature
(see Section 5). In the following, we take a closer look at their connection to clarify their characteristic
differences. Expected power is merely a weighted average of the probability to reject in the relevance region
θ ≥ θMCID, where the weight function is given by the conditional prior density ϕ(· |Θ ≥ θMCID) defined in
equation (7)
EP(n) = E
[
PrΘ[Zn > z1−α ] | Θ > θMCID
]
(21)
=
∫ ∞
θMCID
Prθ[Zn > z1−α ] ϕ(θ |Θ ≥ θMCID) d θ . (22)
PoS(n), on the other hand, integrates the probability to reject over the same region using the unconditional
prior density (see equations (17) and (22)). Thus, in contrast to PoS(n), expected power does not depend
on the a priori probability of a relevant effect size but only on the relative magnitude of the prior density
(‘a priori likelihood’) of relevant parameter values. Since the conditional prior density differs from the
unconditional one only by normalisation via the a priori probability of a relevant effect, it follows from
equation (19) that EP(n) and PoS(n) differ only by the constant factor Pr[ Θ ≥ θMCID ]. Consequentially, any
constraint on probability of success can be reformulated as a constraint on expected power and vice versa
PoS(n) ≥ 1− β ⇔ EP(n) ≥ (1− β) / Pr[ Θ ≥ θMCID ] . (23)
Furthermore, since PoS(n) = EP(n) Pr[ Θ ≥ θMCID ] and EP(n) ≤ 1, PoS(n) can never exceed the a priori
probability of a relevant effect, Pr[ Θ ≥ θMCID ]. This implies that the usual conventions on the choice of β as
the maximal type II error rate for a point alternative cannot be meaningful in terms of the unconditional
PoS(n), since the maximum attainable probability of success is the situation-specific a priori probability
of a relevant effect. The need to recalibrate typical benchmark thresholds when considering probability of
success was previously discussed in the literature. For instance, O’Hagan and Stevens [2001] states that “[t]he
assurance figure is often much lower [than the power], because there is an appreciable prior probability that
the treatment difference is less than δ∗”, where in their notation, δ∗ corresponds to θMCID in our notation. A
similar argument is put forward in Rufibach et al. [2016, Section 2] for PoS′(n). The key issue is thus whether
one is interested in the joint probability of rejecting the null hypothesis and the effect being relevant, PoS(n),
or the conditional probability of the rejecting the null hypothesis given a relevant effect, EP(n). While the
interpretation of both quantities is different, in any particular situation, they only differ by a constant factor.
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3.1 Expected power versus quantile-based approach for sample size derivation
Since expected power and probability of success are proportional, it suffices to compare expected power
and the quantile-based approach outlined in Section 2 with respect to sample size derivation. Consider
θ′′ := Q1−γ [ Θ ≥ θMCID ] and an arbitrary but fixed parameter value θ′ > θ′′ > θMCID. Clearly, under the
quantile-based approach, the rejection probability at any θ′ > θ′′ does not contribute towards the fulfilment
of the power constraint since the probability to reject is only evaluated at θ′′. For expected power, however,
the total functional derivative with respect to changes in the probability to reject at θ′ and θ′′ is
d EP(n) = ∂ EP(n)
∂ Prθ′′ [Zn > z1−α ]
d Prθ′′ [Zn > z1−α ] +
∂ EP(n)
∂ Prθ′ [Zn > z1−α ]
d Prθ′ [Zn > z1−α ] (24)
= ϕ(θ′′ | θ ≥ θMCID) d Prθ′′ [Zn > z1−α ] + ϕ(θ′ | θ ≥ θMCID) d Prθ′ [Zn > z1−α ] . (25)
Keeping expected power constant, i.e., setting d EP(n) = 0 and solving for d Prθ′ [Zn > z1−α ] yields
0 = ϕ(θ′′ | Θ ≥ θMCID) d Prθ′′ [Zn > z1−α ] + ϕ(θ′ | Θ ≥ θMCID) d Prθ′ [Zn > z1−α ] (26)
⇔ d Prθ′ [Zn > z1−α ] = − ϕ(θ
′ | Θ ≥ θMCID)
ϕ(θ′′ | Θ ≥ θMCID) d Prθ
′′ [Zn > z1−α ] (27)
⇔ d Prθ′ [Zn > z1−α ] = − ϕ(θ
′)
ϕ(θ′′) d Prθ
′′ [Zn > z1−α ] . (28)
A reduction in the probability to reject at θ′′ by one percentage point can thus be compensated by an increase
in the probability to reject at θ′ by ϕ(θ′) /ϕ(θ′′) percentage points. This demonstrates that the core difference
between the prior quantile-based approach and the expected power approach is whether or not a trade-off
between power at different parameter values is deemed permissible (expected power) or not (quantile-based
approach). A structured overview of the terms introduced so far and the respective connections between
them is given in Figure 1.
4 Connection to utility maximisation
In a regulatory environment, and most scientific fields, the choice of the significance level, α, is a pre-
determined quality criterion. In the life sciences a one-sided α of 2.5% is common. Yet, the exact choice
of the threshold 1 − β is much more arbitrary. In clinical trials, 1 − β = 0.9 or 1 − β = 0.8 are common
choices when a classical sample size derivation is conducted. From the previous section it is already clear
that a generic threshold for 1 − β that is independent of the specific context of a trial only makes sense
with conditional approaches like the (conditional prior) quantile approach or when using EP(n) to derive a
required sample size. In principle, the unconditional PoS(n) should be easier to interpret by non-statisticians.
Equation (23) allows the transformation of an EP(n)-based sample size derivation, which can readily use any
of the established values for 1− β, into a PoS(n)-based sample size derivation by re-calibrating the threshold
with the proportionality factor linking EP(n) and PoS(n). This only transforms the conditional criteria
(minimum EP(n)) of the classical sample size derivation to the unconditional domain (minimum PoS(n))
without affecting the derived sample size in any way. For instance, if 1− β = 0.8 and Pr[ Θ ≥ θMCID ] = 0.683,
the transformed threshold for PoS(n) would be 0.5464. In making the assumptions underlying the sample
size derivation more transparent by formulating them in terms of unconditional probabilities, there is a need
to explain to practitioners why the threshold now differs from study to study.
The Bayesian view and the prior density ϕ(·) give a natural answer to this issue of trial-specific thresholds
via the concept of utility maximisation or maximal expected utility (MEU). An in-depth discussion of the
MEU concept is beyond the scope of this manuscript and we refer the reader to, for example, Lindley [1997].
We merely want to highlight the fact that the choice of the constraint threshold 1− β can be justified by
making the link to MEU principles. To this end we consider a particularly simple utility function.
Assume that the maximal type I error rate is still to be controlled at level α. For sake of simplicity, further
assume that a correct rejection of the null hypothesis yields an expected return of λ. Here the return is given
in terms of the average per-patient costs within the trial. Ignoring fixed costs, the expected trial utility (in
units of average per-patient costs) is then given by
U(n) := λ PoS(n)− n (29)
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and the utility-maximising sample size is n∗U (λ) := argmaxn U(n). Obviously, the same sample size would be
obtained by solving problem (20), given
1− β = EP (n∗U (λ)) = Pr[ Θ ≥ θMCID ] PoS (n∗U (λ)) . (30)
The right hand side, Pr[ Θ ≥ θMCID ] PoS
(
n∗U (λ)
)
, is the utility-maximising expected power threshold given
the utility parameter λ. Similarly, one could start with n∗EP for a given β and derive the corresponding λ such
that n∗U (λ) = n∗EP. This value of λ would then correspond to the implied expected reward upon successful
rejection of the null for given β. Under the assumption of a utility function of the form (29), λ and β can
thus be matched such that the corresponding utility maximisation problem and the constraint minimisation
of the sample size under a power constraint both lead to the same required sample size. Consequently,
practitioners are free to either define an expected return upon successful rejection, λ, or a threshold on the
minimal expected power, 1− β.
While it is theoretically attractive to derive the sample size directly based on a utility function, an informed
choice of λ is often hard to justify in practice. In these situations one may instead reverse the perspective and
determine the value of λ under which the utility-maximising design would coincide with the design obtained
under a standard (expected) power threshold of, say, 80% or 90%. The implied reward parameter might
then be used to communicate the consequences of different choices of power thresholds to decision makers
and to inform the final choice of 1− β. This approach can, of course, be generalised to more detailed utility
functions. Note, however, that for utility functions with more than one free parameter there is no longer a
one-to-one correspondence between power level and utility parameters. Rather, for a given power level, there
will be a level-set of values for the utility parameters that match the specified power. We give a practical
example of this process in Section 7.5.
Table 1: Selected publications on ‘hybrid’ sample size derivation based on error rates. Structured by concepts
as defined in Figure 1.
Concept References Notes
Marginal proba-
bility to reject
H0
Crook and Good [1982] Termed ‘strength’; application in multinomial contin-
gency tables.
Spiegelhalter and Freed-
man [1986]
Only implicitly mentioned; discussing close relation to
PoS(n), termed ‘expected/average power’ in Spiegel-
halter et al. [2004].
Gillett [1994] Termed ‘average power‘; focus on replication.
O’Hagan and Stevens
[2001]
Termed ‘assurance’ or ‘expected power’; different
from our notion of expected power which is condi-
tional on a relevant effect, see also [O’Hagan et al.,
2005].
Chuang-Stein [2006] Termed ‘average probability of success’; discusses
other definitions of ‘success’ based on additional cri-
teria for the observed point estimates; discusses how
basing the sample size on relevance arguments alone
is theoretically correct but ineffective if evidence for
larger effect sizes is available, see also Chuang-Stein
et al. [2011].
Grouin et al. [2007] Termed ‘predictive power’ and ‘predictive probability
to reject H0’; review of regulatory aspects, discussion
of interval-based sample size calculation, and utility
considerations.
Daimon [2008] Termed ‘hybrid Neyman–Pearson–Bayesian (hNPB)
probability‘; application in non-inferiority setting.
Shao et al. [2008] Termed ‘adjusted power’; review of regulatory aspects,
discussion of interval-based sample size calculation,
and utility considerations.
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Concept References Notes
Liu [2010] Termed ‘extended Bayesian expected power 1’; ex-
tended by treating variance as unknown, also consider
PoS(n) and EP(n).
Lan and Wittes [2012] Termed ‘average power’; discusses upper limit of ‘av-
erage power‘ depending on prior choice and suggest
truncated priors which would be very close to condi-
tioning on a relevant effect.
Carroll [2013] Termed ‘assurance’ and ‘probability of success’ (PoS);
discusses other definitions of success but all defini-
tions are also exclusively based on observed quanti-
ties (minimum threshold on point estimate), see also
Chuang-Stein [2006].
Brutti et al. [2014] Termed ‘predictive frequentist power’; also discusses
sample size derivation based on Bayesian decision
criteria.
Ren and Oakley [2014] Termed ‘assurance’; discusses ideas of O’Hagan et al.
[2005] in time-to-event setting.
Hu [2014] Termed ‘probability of success’; considers priors on
mean and standard deviation; discuss upper limit
on probability of success in the more complex two-
parameter situation.
Ibrahim et al. [2015] Termed ‘average probability of success’; discussed in
context of historical data integration.
Walley et al. [2015] Termed ‘assurance’ or ‘probability of success’; exten-
sion to multi-parameter situations.
Ciarleglio et al. [2015] Termed ‘expected power’; also consider EP(n) and
PoS(n), very similar settings considered in Ciarleglio
et al. [2016], Ciarleglio and Arendt [2017].
Rufibach et al. [2016] Termed ‘assurance’ or ‘probability of success’; in-
depth discussion of the distribution of the probability
to reject the null hypothesis.
Saint-Hilary et al. [2018] Termed ‘predictive probability of success’; consider
both ‘statistical success’ (p-value ≤ α) and ‘clinical
relevance’ (observed effect above relevance threshold),
see also Saint-Hilary et al. [2019].
Chen and Ho [2017] Termed ‘assurance’ and ‘expected power’; discusses
conditional nature of the (frequentist) probability to
reject the null hypothesis from a Bayesian perspective.
Jiang [2011], Kirby et al.
[2012], Zhang and Zhang
[2013], Wang et al. [2015],
Götte et al. [2017]
Termed ‘probability of statistical success’, ‘probabil-
ity of success’, ‘assurance’, ‘predictive power’; dis-
cusses extensions to multiple studies or entire drug
development programs.
Ambrosius et al. [2012],
Wang et al. [2013], Wang
[2015], Crisp et al. [2018],
Chen and Chen [2018]
Termed ‘assurance’, ‘probability of success’, ‘probabil-
ity of study success’; practical applications in various
settings.
Probability of
success
Spiegelhalter and Freed-
man [1986]
Only implicitly mentioned, termed ‘prior adjusted
power’ in Spiegelhalter et al. [2004]; discusses close
relation to marginal probability to reject H0 (suggest-
ing the latter as practical approximation).
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Concept References Notes
Brown et al. [1987] Termed ‘expected power’; also discusses ‘conditional
expected power’ which corresponds to our definition
of EP(n).
Shao et al. [2008] Termed ‘adjusted power‘; application of the ideas of
Spiegelhalter et al. [2004] to binary setting, define
probability of success but approximate it with the
marginal probability to reject H0.
Liu [2010] Termed ‘extended Bayesian expected power 2’; ex-
tended by treating variance as unknown, also consid-
ers PoS′(n) and EP(n).
Ciarleglio et al. [2015] Termed ‘prior-adjusted power’; also considers EP(n)
and PoS′(n), very similar settings considered in Ciar-
leglio et al. [2016], Ciarleglio and Arendt [2017].
Expected power Brown et al. [1987] Termed ‘conditional expected power’; also discusses
unconditional expected power which corresponds to
our definition of PoS(n).
Spiegelhalter et al. [2004] Not named; referencing Brown et al. [1987].
Liu [2010] Termed ‘extended Bayesian expected power 3’; ex-
tended by treating variance as unknown, also consider
PoS(n) and PoS(n).
Ciarleglio et al. [2015] Termed ‘conditional expected power’; also consid-
ers PoS(n) and PoS′(n), very similar settings consid-
ered in Ciarleglio et al. [2016], Ciarleglio and Arendt
[2017].
5 Literature review of terminology
A structured overview of the literature on ‘hybrid’ Bayesian sample size derivation in the context of clinical
trials is given in Table 1. The table relates publications in the field to the terms defined in Figure 1.
Publications with a similar take on the matter are grouped. In the following, we highlight a few particularly
interesting contributions and how they relate to the definitions used in this manuscript.
The majority of the manuscripts only consider the marginal probability to reject H0 (PoS′(n)). Many
publications refer to O’Hagan and Stevens [2001] or O’Hagan et al. [2005], where this quantity was introduced
as ‘assurance’. The range of names for what we call the ‘marginal probability to reject H0’ is, however, quite
diverse: ‘assurance’, ‘probability of success’, ‘predictive probability of success’, ‘average probability of success’,
‘probability of statistical success’, ‘probability of study success’, ‘predictive power’, ‘predictive frequentist
power’, ‘expected power’, ‘average power’, ‘strength’, ‘extended Bayesian expected power 1’, and ‘hybrid
Neyman-Pearson-Bayesian probability’.
However, only a handful of authors elaborate on the intricacies of defining what exactly constitutes a ‘success’
and whether to consider an unconditional measure of success or to condition on the presence of a relevant
effect for sample size derivation [Spiegelhalter and Freedman, 1986, Brown et al., 1987, Shao et al., 2008,
Liu, 2010, Ciarleglio et al., 2015]. Most publications fail to define explicitly what exactly constitutes a
‘success’. Yet, the use of PoS′(n) implies that rejection of the null hypothesis, irrespective of its truth, must
be considered a success. Our analysis in Section 7.2 confirms the statement in Spiegelhalter et al. [2004]
that PoS′(n) can be used as a practical approximation to PoS(n) in many situations. The exact definition of
‘probability of success’ becomes more interesting when allowing for θMCID > θ0, a potential extension rarely
considered in the literature (see, e.g., Brown et al. [1987] for the binary case). We revisit the distinction
between PoS′(n) and PoS(n) in a concrete example in Section 7.2.
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Probability to reject H0
Sym.: Prθ[Zn > z1−α ]
Def.: Φ
(
θn − z1−α
)
Int.: real number; prob-
ability to reject the
null hypothesis given
a fixed value of θ
Random probability to reject H0
Sym.: RPR(n)
Def.: PrΘ[Zn > z1−α ] = Φ
(√
n/σ (Θ− θ0)− z1−α
)
Int.: random variable; realisations correspond to
the probability to reject the null hypothesis
for Θ = θ
Random power
Sym.: RPow(n)
Def.: RPR(n) | Θ ≥ θMCID
Int.: random variable; realisations correspond to
the probability to reject the null hypothesis
for Θ = θ given a relevant effect
Expected power
Sym.: EP(n)
Def.: Pr[Zn > z1−α | Θ ≥ θMCID ] = E[ RPow(n) ]
=
∫ ∞
θMCID
Prθ[Zn > z1−α ] ϕ(θ |Θ ≥ θMCID) d θ
Int.: real number; average probability to reject the
null weighted with prior density conditional
on Θ ≥ θMCID
Probability of success
Sym.: PoS(n)
Def.: Pr[Zn > z1−α,Θ ≥ θMCID ]
=
∫ ∞
θMCID
Prθ[Zn > z1−α ] ϕ(θ) d θ
Int.: real number; joint probability to reject the
null and have a relevant effect; average prob-
ability to reject on Θ ≥ θMCID weighted with
unconditional prior density
Marginal probability to reject H0
Sym.: PoS′(n)
Def.: Prϕ(·)[Zn > z1−α ] = E[ RPR(n) ]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Prθ[Zn > z1−α ] ϕ(θ) d θ
Int.: real number; marginal probability to reject
the null irrespective of underlying effect
replace fixed pa-
rameter θ with
random variable
Θ ∼ ϕ(·)
condition on
Θ ≥ θMCID
integrate with respect
to prior conditional
on relevant effect,
ϕ(· | Θ ≥ θMCID)
integrate over
θ ≥ θMCID
with uncondi-
tional prior
ϕ(·)
integrate
over entire
parameter
range with
unconditional
prior ϕ(·)
form expected value
·Pr[Zn > z1−α ]
add expected type one error
rate and probability of rejec-
tion under irrelevant values
form
expected
value
form
expected
value
Figure 1: Structured overview of all quantities related to ‘power’ that are introduced in Sections 1 to 3.
The symbols used in the text (Sym.), their exact definitions (Def.), and verbal interpretation (Int.) are
summarised in the respective boxes. The relationships between the individual quantities are given as labelled
arrows. For an overview of previous mentions and synonyms used in the literature, see Table 1.
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The exact choice of wording should not be given too much weight. However, we feel that any notion of power
in the ‘hybrid’ Bayesian/frequentist setting should be conditional on a relevant effect (or at least a non-null
effect) to preserve the conditional nature of the purely frequentist power. Using the term ‘power’ to refer to a
joint probability like the ‘expected power’ of Brown et al. [1987] and Ciarleglio et al. [2015] (our PoS(n)) or
the ‘average/expected power’ of Spiegelhalter et al. [2004] (our PoS′(n)) is potentially misleading. Others
suggest ‘conditional expected power’ for EP(n) to distinguish it from ‘expected power’ (our PoS′(n)) [Brown
et al., 1987, Ciarleglio et al., 2015]. This wording, however, may lead to confusion when also considering
interim analyses where ‘conditional power’ is a well-established term for the probability of rejecting the null
hypothesis given θalt and partially observed data [Bauer et al., 2016].
A particularly interesting publication is Liu [2010]. They extend hybrid sample size derivation in the normal
case to also incorporate uncertainty about the variance and clearly distinguish between PoS′(n) = ‘extended
Bayesian expected power 1’, PoS(n) = ‘extended Bayesian expected power 2’, and EP(n) = ‘extended
Bayesian expected power 3’. Apart from nomenclature, our definitions of these three quantities only differ in
that they assume the standard deviation to be fixed and the fact that we accommodate the optional notion
of a relevant effect via θMCID. The former makes explicit formulas more manageable, the latter is important to
keep sample sizes small in situations with vague or conservative prior information but substantial relevance
thresholds. Liu [2010] and Rufibach et al. [2016] are also the only publications we found that study the
distribution of the quantities that are averaged over (RPR(n) and RPow(n) in our notation, see Figures 4
and 5). In Ciarleglio et al. [2015], the distinction between all three quantities is also made explicit (‘expected
power’ is our PoS′(n), ‘prior-adjusted power’ is our PoS(n), and ‘conditional expected power’ is our EP(n)).
6 Prior elicitation
A major issue in modelling uncertainty and computing sample size via prior densities is the elicitation of an
adequate prior. At first glance, non-informative or ‘objective’ priors seem to be a viable choice. As illustrated
in Rufibach et al. [2016], the prior crucially impacts the properties and interpretability of PoS′ and likewise
any other quantity depending on ϕ(·) in Figure 1, so careful selection is paramount. Often in clinical research,
there is no direct prior knowledge on the effect size of interest, e.g., overall survival in a phase III trial, as
no randomised trials comparing these same treatments using the same endpoint have been run previously.
Researchers are then often tempted to use a vague prior, typically a normal prior with large variance, as, e.g.,
advocated in Saint-Hilary et al. [2019].
Assuming a non-informative, improper prior for Θ would imply that arbitrarily large effect sizes are just as
likely as small ones. Yet, in clinical trials, the standardised effect size rarely exceeds 0.5 [Lamberink et al.,
2018]. We thus illustrate the characteristics of the different approaches to defining power constraints under
uncertainty using a convenient truncated Gaussian prior. The truncated Gaussian is conjugate to a Gaussian
likelihood and allows us to restrict the plausible range of effect sizes to, e.g., liberally [−1, 1]. Also, the
truncated Gaussian is the maximum entropy distribution on the truncation interval, given mean and variance
which can be interpreted as a ‘least-informative’ property under constraints on the first two moments.
Alternatively, a trial designer can formally elicit a prior on the effect size of interest. Kinnersley and Day
describe a structured approach to the elicitation of expert beliefs in a clinical trial context based on the
SHELF framework [Kinnersley and Day, 2013, Oakley and O’Hagan, 2019]. Dallow et al. [2018] discusses
how SHELF is routinely used within a pharmaceutical company to define prior distributions that are used in
conjunction with calculation of probability of success and to inform internal decision making at key project
milestones. Formal and informal prior elicitation is also discussed in Spiegelhalter et al. [2004].
7 Results
7.1 Comparison of required sample sizes for various prior choices
Let θMCID = 0.1 and let the maximal feasible sample size be 1000. Figure 2 shows the required sample sizes
under the expected power, the probability of success, and the quantile approach (for γ = 0.5, 0.9). We use
α = 0.025 and β = 0.2.
The patterns of required sample sizes are qualitatively different between the three approaches. For probability
of success, large prior uncertainty implies low a priori probability of a relevant effect and thus the required
sample sizes explode for large prior standard deviations (in relation to the prior mean). For very large
standard deviations, the constraint on probability of success becomes infeasible.
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Figure 2: Required sample size plotted against prior parameters (Normal truncated to [-0.3, 0.7], with varying
mean and standard deviation); θMCID = 0.1; EP = Expected Power, PoS = Probability of Success, quantile =
quantile approach with γ = 0.5 and γ = 0.9, respectively.
The expected power criterion leads to a completely different sample size pattern. Since expected power is
defined conditional on a relevant effect, large prior uncertainty increases the weight in the upper tails of the
power curve where power quickly approaches one. Consequently, for small prior means, larger uncertainty
decreases the required sample size. For large prior means, however, smaller prior uncertainty leads to smaller
sample sizes since again more weight is concentrated in the tails of the power curve.
The characteristics of the prior-quantile approach very much depend on the choice of γ. When using the
conditional prior median (γ = 0.5) the approach is qualitatively similar to the expected power approach. This
is due to the fact that computing power on the conditional median of the prior is close to computing power
on the conditional prior mean. Since the power function is locally linear around the centre of mass of the
conditional prior, this approximates computing expected power by interchanging forming the expected value
and computing power (i.e., first average the prior and then compute power or average over power with weights
given by the conditional prior). For a stricter criterion (γ = 0.9) the required sample sizes are much larger.
This is due to the fact that the quantile approach does not allow a trade-off between power in the upper
tails of the power curve and regions with low power. Higher uncertainty then decreases the (1− γ)-quantile
towards the minimal relevant effect and thus increases the required sample size.
7.2 Probability of success as the basis for sample size derivation
In theory, one might be inclined to derive a sample size based on the probability of success instead of using
expected power. Consider a situation in which the a priori probability of Θ ≥ θMCID is 0.51. The probability
of success is then only 41% (for 80% expected power) or 46% (for 90% expected power). A sponsor might
want to increase these relatively low unconditional success probabilities by deriving a sample size based on
a minimal PoS(n) of 1− β instead. The choice of 1− β is limited by the a priori probability of a relevant
effect (0.51 in this case). Using equation (23) a minimal probability of success of 0.5 is equivalent to requiring
an expected power of more than 98%. In essence, the attempt to increase PoS(n) via a more stringent
threshold on EP(n) implies that low a priori chances of success are to be offset with an almost certain
detection (EP(n) ≈ 1) in the unlikely event of an effect actually being present. The ethical implication of
this approach to sample size derivation is that an extremely large number of patients would be exposed to
treatment although the sponsor more or less expects it to be ineffective.
This example demonstrates that the (situation agnostic) conventions on power levels cannot be transferred to
thresholds for probability of success without adjustment for the situation-specific a priori probability of a
relevant effect. It thus seems much easier to directly impose a constraint on expected power, which implicitly
adjusts for the a prior probability of a relevant effect via equation (23).
To investigate the difference between the probability of success, PoS(n), and the marginal probability of
rejecting the null hypothesis, PoS′(n), Figure 3 visualises the proportion of the individual components of
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Figure 3: Components of PoS′(n) for n = 150, θ0 = 0, α = 0.25, θMCID = 0.1 and varying prior mean and
standard deviation; numbers correspond to overall PoS′(n); proportions in individual pie charts correspond to:
A = probability to reject and null effect (type I error), B = probability to reject and irrelevant but non-null
effect, C = probability to reject and relevant effect (PoS).
PoS′(n) for varying prior standard deviation and prior means. The sample size is fixed at n = 150, θ0 = 0,
the maximal type I error rate is α = 0.025, and the minimal clinically important difference is θMCID = 0.1.
Evidently, the contribution of type I errors (component ‘A’ in Figure 3) to PoS′(n) is mostly negligible unless
the prior is sharply peaked at an effect size slightly smaller than the null. The a priori probability of a
relevant effect size is close to zero in these cases and so is PoS′(n). For the more practically relevant scenarios
with prior mean greater than θ0 = 0, the contribution of the average type I error rate to PoS′(n) is almost
negligible. Still, if θMCID > θ0, PoS′(n) might be inflated substantially by rejections under parameter values
that are non-null but also not clinically relevant. This phenomenon evidently depends on the magnitude of
θMCID; the more of the prior mass concentrated in [ 0, θMCID ], the larger the contribution towards PoS′(n). If
θMCID = 0, the numeric difference between PoS and PoS′ is negligible since the maximal type I error rate is
controlled at level α and the power curve quickly approaches zero on the interior of the null hypothesis. This
was already pointed out by Spiegelhalter et al. [2004], who argue that PoS′(n) can be used as approximation
to PoS(n) in many practically relevant situations.
7.3 Distribution of random power under a constraint on expected power
To further investigate the properties of the random variable PrΘ[Zn > z1−α ], we consider three example
prior configurations with means −0.25, 0.3, 0.5 and standard deviations 0.4, 0.125, 0.05 respectively. The
corresponding sample sizes to reach an expected power of at least 80% are 854, 126, and 32. Figure 4 shows
the unconditional and conditional (on a relevant effect) priors, the corresponding probability of rejecting the
null as a function of θ, and histograms of the distributions of random power (RPow(n)), and the unconditional
probability to reject the null hypothesis (RPR(n)).
Clearly, the distributions of the conditional and unconditional rejection probabilities (random power and
random probability to reject, respectively) are qualitatively very different in the three situations. In the first
case (mean −0.25, standard deviation 0.4), the prior mass is mostly concentrated on the null hypothesis
and the normalising factor that links the unconditional and the conditional prior is clearly noticeable. The
conditional prior then assigns most weight to values of θ close to the relevance threshold leading to a large
required sample size. The large sample size then implies a steep power curve and a distribution of RPow(n)
that is highly right-skewed towards 1 since RPow(n) is conditional on Θ > θMCID. If the unconditional
distribution of the rejection probability is considered instead (RPR(n)), the characteristic u-shape discussed
in Rufibach et al. [2016] is recovered.
For the intermediate setting (mean 0.3, standard deviation 0.125), most prior mass is already concentrated
on relevant values. The difference between conditional and unconditional prior is less pronounced (the
normalising factor is closer to 1) and even the unconditional distribution of the rejection probability is no
longer u-shaped.
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Figure 4: Top: conditional and unconditional prior PDF and power curves corresponding to n∗EP for 1−β = 0.8.
Bottom: histogram of the random power (conditional on relevant effect) and the random probability to
reject (unconditional); vertical lines indicate 80% power and the numbers are the respective (conditional)
probabilities to exceed a probability to reject of 80%.
Finally, in the last setting (mean 0.5, standard deviation 0.05), θ is almost certainly highly relevant. Since
the normalising factor is thus close to 1, there is no discernible difference between the conditional and the
unconditional prior densities. Not surprisingly, the assumption of a highly relevant effect with high certainty
only requires a small sample size (32). This leads to a relatively flat curve of the rejection probability and to
a peaked distribution of RPow(n) and RPR(n). Flat power curves and high certainty about the effect size
tend to result in peaked distributions of RPow(n) and RPR(n) because the power curve is almost linear in
the region of the parameter where the prior mass is concentrated. The distribution of RPow(n) and RPR(n)
is thus well approximated by a linear transformation of the (conditional) prior, which is a peaked truncated
normal distribution. Since conditioning has almost no effect, the unconditional distribution of the probability
to reject is the same in this case.
Interestingly, both settings with higher a priori uncertainty lead to a high chance of exceeding a power of 80%.
This is due to the fact that the rare occurrence of very low rejection probabilities needs to be compensated to
achieve an overall expected power of 80%.
7.4 Distribution of random power under quantile approach
To compare the results in the previous section with the prior quantile-based approach, we consider the
intermediate example with prior mean 0.3 and prior standard deviation 0.2 again. For this situation, the
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Figure 5: Top: conditional and unconditional prior PDF for a truncated normal prior on [−0.3, 0.7] with
mean 0.3, standard deviation 0.2 and power curves corresponding to n∗γ for 1− β = 0.8 or 0.7 and θMCID = 0.1;
Bottom: histogram of the random power (conditional on relevant effect) and the random probability to reject
(unconditional); vertical lines mark 80% power and the number are the respective (conditional) probabilities
to exceed a probability to reject of either 70% or 80%.
required sample sizes under γ = 0.5, 0.9 and target power 0.7 or 0.8, the corresponding curves of the rejection
probability, and histograms of the distribution of the rejection probability are given in Figure 5.
The required sample sizes depend heavily on the choice of γ. The crucial difference between the quantile-based
and the expected power approach is that for the prior quantile approach the exact distribution of power below
the target value of 80% is irrelevant; only the total mass of the distribution below this critical point matters.
This means that the sample size for the γ = 0.5 cases are substantially lower than the corresponding sample
size derived from an expected power constraint. The flip side of this ignorance about the exact amount by
which the target power is undershot is that there is a relatively high chance of ending up with a severely
underpowered study in these cases. Increasing the certainty to exceed a power of 80% or 70% by setting
γ = 0.9, however, leads to substantially larger required sample sizes than under the expected power approach.
The example demonstrates the problems arising from having to specify both γ and 1− β. While this allows
more fine-grained control over the distribution of the (conditional) rejection probability, there seems to be no
canonical choice for γ, which is critical in determining the required sample size.
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Figure 6: Left panel: prior PDF and conditional prior PDF (on Θ > θMCID = 0.05); middle panel: probability
to reject the null hypothesis as function of θ for the expected power design (EP), the design powered for
θMCID (MCID), the design based on power at the conditional prior median (quantile 0.5), and the design using
the conditional 0.1-quantile, i.e. γ = 0.9 (quantile 0.9); right panel: CDF of random power (probability to
reject given Θ > θMCID = 0.05) for the four different design choices.
7.5 A clinical trial example
To make things more tangible, consider the case of a clinical trial designed to demonstrate superiority of
an intervention over a historical control group with respect to the endpoint of overall survival. To stay
within the framework of (approximately) normally distributed test statistics, we assume that effect sizes
are given on a standardised log hazard scale, i.e., θ = 0 corresponds to no difference in overall survival
and θ > 0 to superiority of the intervention group. Assume that the prior for the treatment effect of the
intervention is given by a truncated Normal distribution on [−0.3, 0.7 ] with mean 0.2 and standard deviation
0.2 (pre-truncation). The minimal clinically relevant difference is set to θMCID = 0.05. This setting corresponds
to an a priori probability of a relevant effect of approximately 0.86.
Figure 6 shows the (conditional) prior density, the curves of the rejection probability corresponding to the
required sample sizes derived from constraints on a minimal probability to reject of 1 − β = 0.8 at θMCID
(MCID), at Q0.5[ Θ ≥ θMCID ] ≈ 0.26 (quantile, 0.5), at Q0.9[ Θ ≥ θMCID ] ≈ 0.10 (quantile, 0.9), or a minimal
expected power of 1− β = 0.8 (EP).
In this case the MCID criterion requires n = 3140. The quantile approach (with γ = 0.9) already reduces this
to n = 834 while still maintaining an a priori chance of 90% to exceed the target power of 80%. The quantile
approach with γ = 0.5 results in the lowest sample size of n = 120 at the cost of only having a 50% chance to
exceed the target power of 80%. The EP approach is more liberal than the quantile approach (γ = 0.9) with
n = 218 but still guarantees a chance of exceeding the target power of roughly 75%. A sample size based on
PoS(n) ≥ 1− β = 0.8 cannot be derived in this example since the a priori probability of a relevant value
is lower than 0.8. The large spread between the derived sample sizes shows how sensitive the the required
sample size is to the changes in the power constraint. Clearly, the MCID approach is highly ineffective, as
accepting a small chance to undershoot the target power with the quantile approach (γ = 0.9) reduces the
required sample size from n = 3140 to roughly a quarter (n = 834). At the other extreme, constraining power
only on the conditional prior median (quantile approach, γ = 0.5) leads to a rather unattractive a priori
distribution of the random power: by definition, the probability to exceed a rejection probability of 0.8 is still
0.5 but the a priori chance of ending up with a severely underpowered study is non-negligible.
These considerations leave the trial-sponsor with essentially two options. Either a range of scenarios for the
quantile approach with values of γ between 0.5 and 0.9 could be discussed in more detail and a decision on
the exact value of γ could be reached by considering the corresponding distributions of RPow(n), or the
intermediate EP approach could be used. We assume that the trial-sponsor accepts the implicit trade-off
inherent to expected power and decides to base the sample size derivation on the EP approach. The required
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Figure 7: Utility-maximising implied reward λ for varying expected power levels in the situation discussed in
Section 7.5.
sample size for an (expected) power of 80% is then n = 218. Note that this still means that there is a roughly
one-in-five a priori probability to end up in a situation with less than 50% power (see Figure 6, CDF panel).
In a situation where 1− β = 0.8 is not set in stone, further insights might be gained by making the link to
utility maximisation explicit. In a first step, we will assume that the sponsor has no way of quantising the
reward parameter λ directly. One may then guide decision making by computing the values of λ that lead to
the same required sample size for a range of values of β. Figure 7 shows this ‘implied reward’ as function of
the minimal expected power constraint. An expected power of 0.8 is thus ideal in this situation if the expected
reward upon successful (i.e., the effect is indeed relevant) rejection of the null hypothesis is approximately
1732 times the average per-patient costs within the planned trial. Using the curve depicted in Figure 7, a
discussion with the trial sponsor about the plausibility of certain reward levels can be started. Usually the
average per-patient costs are well-known in advance, so that the scale can even be transformed to monetary
units, e.g., $US. Assume to this end, that for the particular study at hand, the expected average per-patient
costs are 30 000 $US. Then, the sample size corresponding to an expected power of 0.8 is maximising utility if
the expected reward is 30 000 · 1732 = 51.96 · 106 $US. The utility-maximising reward for an expected power
of 0.9 would be approximately 6006, i.e., 180.18 · 106 $US. Even without committing to a fixed value of λ,
these considerations can be used to guide the decision as to which of the ‘standard’ power levels (0.8 or 0.9)
might be more appropriate in the situation at hand.
Of course, one might also directly optimise utility if the reward upon successful rejection of the null hypothesis
can be specified. To that end, assume that a reward of 100 · 106 $US is expected. Under the same assumption
about average per-patient costs, this translates to λ ≈ 3333. The utility-maximising sample size is then
n = 329 and the corresponding utility-maximising expected power is 0.86.
8 Discussion
The concept of ‘hybrid’ sample size derivations based on Bayesian priors for planning and the design’s
frequentist error rate properties is well-established in the literature on clinical trial design. Nevertheless, the
substantial variation in the terminology used and small differences in the exact definition of the terms used
can be confusing. We have tried our best to formulate a consistent naming scheme, to be explicit about the
exact definitions, highlight connections between the different quantities (see Figure 1), and to relate back to
previous authors (see Table 1). Any naming scheme necessarily has a subjective element to it and ours is
by no means exempt from this problem (see also https://xkcd.com/927/). We do hope, however, that our
review encourages a clearer separation between terminology for joint probabilities (avoiding the use of the
word ‘power’) and for probabilities that condition on the presence of an effect (‘power’ seems more appropriate
here), as well as a more transparent distinction between arguments based on a priori likelihood of effects
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and their relevance. We also strongly believe that an explicit definition (in formulae) of any quantities used
should be given when discussing the subject. Merely referring to terms like ‘expected power’ or ‘probability
of success’ are too ambiguous given their inconsistent use in the literature.
Often, the main argument for a ‘hybrid’ approach to sample size derivation is the fact that the uncertainty
about the true underlying effect can be incorporated in the planning of a design. This is certainly a major
advantage but it is equally important that the ‘hybrid’ approach allows a very natural distinction between
arguments relating to the (relative) a priori likelihood of different parameter values (encoded in the prior
density) and relevance arguments (encoded in the choice of θMCID). The fact that these two components can
be represented naturally within the ‘hybrid’ approach has the potential to make sample size derivation much
more transparent.
The ‘hybrid’ quantity considered most commonly in the literature is the marginal probability to reject H0.
Often, it is not clear whether the authors are aware of the fact that this quantity includes the error of
rejecting the null hypothesis incorrectly, i.e. when θ < θMCID. In many practical situations this problem is
numerically negligible and PoS′(n) ≈ PoS(n), i.e., the marginal probability to reject the null hypothesis is
approximately the same as the joint probability of a non-null effect and the rejection of the null hypothesis.
If, however, the definition of ‘success’ also takes into account a non-trivial relevance threshold θMCID > θ0, the
distinction becomes more important in practice. Given the great emphasis on strict type I error rate control
in the clinical trials community it seems at least strange to implicitly consider type I errors as ‘successful’
trial outcomes. Beyond these principled considerations, a practical advantage of PoS(n) over PoS′(n) is the
direct and simple connection to EP(n) = PoS(n)/Pr[ Θ ≥ θMCID ]. While EP(n) is independent of the a priori
probability of a relevant effect and only depends on the relative a priori likelihood of different effects through
the conditional prior, PoS(n) does directly depend on Pr[ Θ ≥ θMCID ]. Although Spiegelhalter et al. [2004]
see this as a disadvantage of EP(n), it is actually a necessary property to use it for sample size derivation
without re-calibrating the conventional values for 1− β (see also Brown et al., 1987). If one tried to derive a
sample size such that PoS(n) = 0.8 this would be impossible for situations with Pr[ Θ ≥ θMCID ] < 0.8. In a
situation where Pr[ Θ ≥ θMCID ] exceeds 0.8 only slightly, the expected power (EP(n)) would have to be close
to 1 to compensate for the a priori probability of a relevant effect. In essence, one would thus increase the
sample size in situations where the efficacy of the new treatment is still uncertain. This would put more study
participants at risk just to make sure that the treatment effect is detected almost certainly if it is indeed
present. The use of PoS(n) for sample size derivation thus only makes sense in a setting where the threshold
1 − β is adapted to the a priori probability of a relevant effect. The simplest way to do so is by using
PoS(n) ≥ Pr[ Θ ≥ θMCID ] (1 − β) which is, however, entirely equivalent to EP(n) ≥ 1 − β. Another option
to derive situation-specific thresholds is via utility maximisation, and PoS(n) is a key term in the simple
expected utility function proposed in Section 4. Ultimately, PoS(n) and EP(n) can be used interchangeably
once the prior distribution is fixed as long as the respective multiplicative factor is taken into account. The
main advantage of PoS(n) is that it is an unconditional probability which might be easier to interpret by
practitioners, while EP(n) can be readily used in conjunction with an already established power threshold in
a research field.
A slightly different concept to sample size derivation via expected power is what we call the ‘quantile approach’.
This approach uses a different functional of the probability to reject the null hypothesis given a relevant effect.
Instead of the mean, we propose to use a γ quantile of this distribution. Compared to expected power, this
allows direct control of the left-tail of the a priori distribution of the probability to reject the null hypothesis
given a relevant effect. This can be desirable since a sample size derived via a threshold for expected power
might still lead to a substantial chance of ending up with an underpowered study. This can be avoided with
the quantile approach and a higher value for γ (see Figure 5). The quantile approach is also relatively easy
to implement in practice, since it is just a Bayesian justification for powering on a point alternative. This
flexibility comes at the price of having to specify an additional parameter, γ (the acceptable risk of ending
up with an underpowered study). Theoretically, both expected power and the prior quantile approach are
perfectly viable to determine a sample size. Whichever approach is preferred, it is certainly advisable to not
only plot the corresponding power curves but also the resulting distribution of RPow(n) (see Figure 4). In
essence, the problem of defining a ‘hybrid’ power constraint boils down to finding a summary functional of the
power curve that reflects the planning objectives. Ideally, one would like to control the a priori distribution of
RPow(n) such that it is sharply peaked around a certain target value avoiding both over- and underpowered
studies. Yet, controlling both location (e.g., mean) and spread (e.g., standard deviation) of the distribution
of RPow(n) is impossible. A second constraint on the standard deviation of RPow(n) in addition to the
mean constraint (expected power) would led to an over-determined problem since there is only one free
parameter, n. To increase expected power, the sample size must be increased. The standard deviation of
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RPow(n), however, decreases as the sample size is lowered since this flattens the power curve of the resulting
test (the standard deviation would be 0 if the power curve was constant). Both conflicting objectives (high
expected power, low standard deviation of power) are thus not fulfillable at the same time.
Finally, it should be stressed again that the key frequentist property of strict type I error rate control of the
designs are not affected by the fact that the arguments for calculating a required sample size are Bayesian.
In fact, at no point, the Bayes theorem is invoked (i.e. the posterior distribution of the effect size is not
required). The Bayesian perspective is merely a principled and insightful way of specifying a weight function
(prior density) that can then be used to guide the choice of the power level of the design, or as Brown et al.
[1987] put it: “This proposed use of Bayesian methods should not be criticised by frequentists in that these
methods do not replace any current statistical techniques, but instead offer additional guidance where current
practice is mute”.
Supplemental Materials
The code required to reproduce the figures is available at https://github.com/kkmann/
sample-size-calculation-under-uncertainty. A permanent backup of the exact version of the
repository used for this manuscript is available under the digital object identifier 10.5281/zen-
odo.3899943 (release 0.2.1). An interactive version of the repository at the time of publication is
hosted at https://mybinder.org/v2/gh/kkmann/sample-size-calculation-under-uncertainty/
0.2.1?urlpath=lab/tree/notebooks/figures-for-manuscript.ipynb using Binder [Jupyter et al.,
2018]. A simple shiny app implementing the sample size calculation procedures is available
at https://mybinder.org/v2/gh/kkmann/sample-size-calculation-under-uncertainty/0.2.1?
urlpath=shiny/apps/sample-size-calculation-under-uncertainty/.
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